Nick Handy
While such a narrow margin between candidates may be unusual, it points out the importance of accuracy in the process and confidence by the public that voting -- the very heart of any democracy -- works as it is intended. That confidence was severely tested in the 2000 presidential election which came down to a few hundred votes in Florida amid charges of irregularities in vote counting. Finally, the Supreme Court stopped the recounts and George W. Bush was declared president. In an essentially adversarial political environment, that is a complete recipe for discontent and suspicion.
This coming January, as the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) goes into effect, and states and counties transition to computerized voting systems, the need for absolute accuracy is paramount to regain the public's trust and confidence.
Handy, however, is more concerned about human error than voting system glitches or fraud. As he explained in Sacramento earlier this week at the Voting Systems Testing Summit, about 80 percent of Washington's voters vote by mail, and the voting systems are selected by the counties and certified by the state. The state has "a very active recount process," said Handy. Machine and manual recounts are done randomly in the state's six yearly elections, and there is a state requirement that allows any political party to request a manual recount of a certain number of precincts.
"These recounts were 99.99 percent accurate," said Handy. The inaccuracies, he said, were due to human error in interpreting the voter's intent: "instead of filling in the oval, they put a little note that says 'I like this guy here,' or put a circle around the oval, or an X in the oval." Also, he said, election workers in the past have sometimes failed to account for all the ballots.
As a result, said Handy, he would suggest putting more attention on training of voters and poll workers, "and not as much energy on the actual voting system devices and workings of hardware and software."
California's Best Practices Blueprint
Bruce McPherson
"We are entering a new era of voting systems technology," said California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson in his introductory remarks at his summit in Sacramento. Among the challenges facing voting officials, he explained are the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) as well as building voter confidence and accessibility.
HAVA, said McPherson, requires voting systems that are free of "hanging chads" and that remove barriers of disability and language. HAVA came into being because of "conditions that raised questions" in voting, and now, the voting process is on everyone's radar. This is not a bad thing, said McPherson, as states are now beginning to share experiences and pool resources. Conference attendees included representatives from 23 states and 18 California counties and showed the extent of interest in collaboration.
The conference is part of a process to develop a "Best Practices Blueprint for state testing of voting systems," said McPherson. Last month, the Secretary of State's Office created the Office of Voting System Technology Assessment for voting system testing and certification. "For the first time," said McPherson, "California will have a strict and clearly articulated list of benchmarks that voting systems and their manufacturers will need to meet in order to be certificated for use in California. Those requirements will be codified into state regulations, not simply be implied or arbitrary, scattered among memos and outdated written procedures."
McPherson said that interested parties are encouraged to offer written comments and reports until Mid-December. Prior to the final blueprint, McPherson will hold a public meeting on the summit's recommendations, most likely in February.
The Federal View
Paul DeGregorio
HAVA, the Help America Vote Act, will take effect Jan. 1, said Paul DeGregorio, of the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) which was created by HAVA. The purpose of HAVA, says the Act, is: "To establish a program to provide funds to states to replace punch card voting systems, to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election laws and programs, to establish minimum election administration standards for states and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of federal elections, and for other purposes."
HAVA, said DeGregorio, will take voting accessibility requirements "to a new level," and will carry new requirements that include provisional voting, complaint procedures, and statewide voter registration lists. $3.1 billion in federal equipment funds have been distributed to states, territories and to Washington, D.C., he said.
The first set of voting system guidelines, said DeGregorio, were developed in 1990 by the Federal Elections Commission. In 2002 the guidelines were updated to include some new technologies, such as direct electronic recording machines. Under HAVA, he said, EAC has a mandate to update the guidelines again, and although states can decide whether to adopt them or not, most will probably do so.
The National Association of State Elections Directors (NASED) had a voluntary voting system qualifications procedure, said DeGregorio, and under HAVA, the EAC will take over this function. A note on the NASED Web site directs inquiries about "previously or currently certified equipment or the testing process to Brian Hancock at bhancock@eac.gov or (866) 747-1471."
What the federal government is doing has implications beyond the United States, said DeGregorio. "I was in Moscow last week, and testing and guidelines have international implications. People are following what we are doing. India and Brazil are using e-voting, and European countries are moving toward it."
State View
Sandy Steinbach
Sandy Steinbach, chair of the NASED Voting Systems Board, and director of elections for the Iowa Secretary of State, said voting systems qualification is not a new process. "We've had computerized voting since the 1960s and 70s," she said, "including computerized voting machines, punch cards, optical scan, and optical scan central count." But voting system failures create tension, she said. Back in 1975, a National Bureau of Standards (now NIST) report said that lack of technical skill at state and local levels were the primary cause of computer related problems. Congress responded in 1984 -- nine years later -- to develop voluntary national standards, and six years later, in 1990, the FEC issued the performance and test standards for punchcard, marksense, and direct recording systems. Then in 2002, the FEC issued the revised standards currently in effect, which are the basic standards incorporated into HAVA, explained Steinbach. "They are in effect until they are replaced by the EAC."
State certification varies greatly state to state, said Steinbach. "Some have no standards, some have rigorous standards." She said the biggest difference is likely to be the redefinition of what a voting system is. Instead of "a box to put your ballot in that counted it," the definition now includes everything, from a definition of ballots to the record-keeping process, instructions, forms and more.
Some states feel that the new guidelines will make everything obsolete, said Steinbach, but that's not necessarily true. The standards are voluntary, and state legislatures will make the decision whether to act on them or not.
Paul Craft
Paul Craft of the Florida Secretary of State's Office, said the Florida Legislature decided to set standards without waiting for the new federal standards to come out. He said that standards should be clear, understandable, consistent and reasonable, and not "include stuff that hasn't been invented yet."
"We provide a third-tier technical assistance to counties for acceptance testing, and system integrity, or if a system is challenged in court ... We require each county to use approved security and operational procedures, and those must be filed with the state office and approved." Last session, said Craft, ballot accounting rules were upgraded, since during the 2004 elections the state discovered some counties were not doing ballot accounting.
Florida also requires a "conduct of election" report, said Craft, so that problems that occur comes to the state's attention, and a solution can be worked out with vendors. "There's no good reward for reporting problems," he said. "You made a choice of systems, and then if you admit a problem exists, it hits the papers, and you are likely to be attacked for it." The press, the public, and the marketing people from competing vendors all jump in, he said.
And finally, said Craft, beginning in January, distribution of uncertified systems is a felony in Florida.
Brit Williams
"Texas is the only state that has more counties than we have," said Dr. Brit Williams of Georgia. "I'm not sure that's anything to brag about." He, like Washington's Nick Handy, said that errors in vote tallying were because of human error. "We had 4,000 ballot scanners for the 2002 election, and not a single glitch was attributed to the voting system."
Williams said that initially, there was concern about elderly voters using the technology, but said it didn't cause a problem. "But we liked the system," he joked. He said that DeKalb and Fulton counties were the first in the country to use computers for voting. But if changes are necessary, it takes four months to get to all 159 counties and costs millions of dollars.
Of all the security threats, said Williams -- attempted election fraud, intentional or accidental disruptions -- accidental disruption is most common, as when a lightning strike cut the power. However, he said, from time to time, there were some people who thought they could use the absentee ballot procedure to alter a local election.
Williams said that no extraneous software is allowed on the servers which are locked up and have no network connectivity of any kind. A simple-to-use hash program checks for any alterations in the code.
Local Concerns
Connie Schmidt
Connie Schmidt, former election commissioner of Johnson County Kansas, said many small counties don't even have computers, and rely on vendors to set up for elections. "There may be no budgets for them to attend conferences like this," said Schmidt, "how do we even know what is certified? Do we know what we received is the certified version? Should we perform our own testing? How do we stay informed about new version releases? How do we educate our voters and election officials?
Some counties in Western Kansas, she explained, have 3x5 cards for voter lists, no optical scans, everything is paper-based. "They need our help," she said, "to go to such things as a statewide computerized database."
Vendors need to routinely notify their customers of current decertified software and hardware, and communicate regarding new version releases, said Schmidt. "States should maintain a list of all state-certified systems, including specific software and hardware components." She said Electionline.org is helpful, but only after the news hits the media.
Standard operating procedure, she said, should include distribution of all test lab operating procedures and reports, and vendor requests for state certification should routinely include distribution of such reports. State certification reports should be communicated to local elections officials.
Voting is like banking, said Schmidt. "Votes are like dollar bills -- you don't want to lose any, and the books have to balance." There are lots of security concerns, but the systems should be simple and straightforward "like a big bank vault," because elections won't wait. And the bottom line, she said, is "if people don't trust the system, they won't vote."
